Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding: A Missed Opportunity to Restore Fourth Amendment Rights to School Children by DISHAROON, STEVE
Comments
Safford Unified School District No. 1 v.
Redding: A Missed Opportunity to
Restore Fourth Amendment Rights to
School Children
By STEVE DISHAROON*
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism.
School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Stu-
dents in school as well as out of school are “persons” under our Constitu-
tion. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect,
just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State.1
Introduction
THIS PROFOUND OBSERVATION by Justice Fortas is perhaps lost
on the majority of today’s U.S. Supreme Court. Recently given the
chance to make this promise a reality for American school children,
the Court instead maintained a misguided precedent, and declined to
recognize rights and remedies to which students are entitled under
the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
This Note analyzes the recent Supreme Court case of Safford Uni-
fied School District No. 1 v. Redding (“Redding”),2 and argues the Court
erred in three respects. First, it should have overturned the flawed
precedent of New Jersey v. T.L.O. (“T.L.O.”),3 and recognized that
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to the U.S.F. Law Review for its excellent work in developing this paper. Finally, I would
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zeal and energy that Professor Nice brings to the classroom has truly inspired me; she has
motivated me to pursue my passions in law and life.
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
2. 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
3. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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school children are entitled to the same basic Fourth Amendment
protections as adults—namely, the default requirements of a warrant
and probable cause in order to search an individual’s person or prop-
erty.4 Second, the Court failed to put an end to the horrific practice of
public school officials strip searching students;5 the Court should have
ruled such searches categorically unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Finally, the Court’s qualified immunity analysis is flawed
in that it allows mere judicial disagreement to control whether a plain-
tiff is entitled to relief.
Part I explains the relevant Fourth Amendment principles at
work in this context. Part II provides an historical background to the
Redding case: it discusses the landmark T.L.O. decision and critiques
two circuit court cases that applied the T.L.O. rule to strip searches.
Part III describes the procedural and factual background of the Red-
ding decision. Part IV analyzes the Fourth Amendment issues in Red-
ding and argues the Court erred in that it (1) did not extend basic
Fourth Amendment rights to school children, and (2) failed to cate-
gorically ban student strip searches. Part V analyzes the qualified im-
munity issue in Redding and argues the Court should not have granted
immunity to the individual defendants. This Part also calls for a new
qualified immunity standard that will ensure a remedy to students
whose rights are violated by school officials.
I. Traditional Fourth Amendment Principles
The Fourth Amendment, which applies to the states by way of the
Fourteenth Amendment,6 reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
4. The term “children” is no doubt broad. In the context of this Note, “children” are
individuals who are not yet eighteen-years-old but still old enough such that they (1) are
fully cognizant of their rights, and (2) do not require special care that necessitates intru-
sion into their bodily privacy. This Note is not concerned with defining a specific age at
which a child attains Fourth Amendment protections. The focus here is to advocate for the
increase in those protections; it is left for another time to determine the exact scope (i.e., a
minimum age requirement).
5. A strip search is defined generally as a “visual inspection of an individual’s body,
including those portions usually hidden by undergarments.” Steven F. Shatz et al., The Strip
Search of Children and the Fourth Amendment, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 1 (1991); see also Ralph D.
Mawdsley & Jacqueline Joy Cumming, Student Informants, School Strip Searches, and Reasona-
bleness: Sorting Out Problems of Inception and Scope, 230 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 12 (2008) (“A strip
search involves students’ removal of some or all of their clothing at the direction of teach-
ers or administrators.”).
6. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949).
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cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.7
Fourth Amendment protections only apply if there is (1) state
action,8 and (2) a search of an area in which a person has a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy.9 The Court has clarified that school offi-
cials are state actors in this context.10 The Court has also recognized
students maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their bod-
ies11 and in the personal belongings they bring to school.12
After these preliminary requirements are satisfied, the question
becomes whether a particular search violates the Fourth Amendment.
The Court has made clear that “searches conducted outside the judi-
cial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”13 These ex-
ceptions include searches that are incident to arrest,14 circumstances
in which a valid exigency requires immediate action,15 and situations
in which consent is obtained.16 Therefore, the general rule is that a
search is unlawful unless it is supported by a warrant issued upon
probable cause.17 In determining whether probable cause exists, the
issuing magistrate or judge should “make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. While the Amendment addresses both searches and
seizures, this Note is only concerned with the former.
8. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333 (holding the Fourth Amendment “applies to searches
conducted by public school officials”).
9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]here
is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expecta-
tion of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recog-
nize as ‘reasonable.’”). Justice Harlan’s approach has been recognized as the governing
standard. See Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test, 40
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2009).
10. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336–37.
11. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641–42
(2009). But see Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) (holding that
student athletes have a reduced expectation of privacy).
12. See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338–40.
13. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (footnote omitted); see also United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
48, 51 (1951) (“Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the Amend-
ment requires adherence to judicial processes.”) (citations omitted).
14. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).
15. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978).
16. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
17. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973).
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before him, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place.”18
In the absence of an exception to the warrant requirement, a
search may still be lawful if it is deemed reasonable under the circum-
stances.19 These types of searches are based on the theory that the
plain language of the Fourth Amendment only prohibits unreasona-
ble searches, and does not always require a warrant or probable
cause.20 Such searches are typically administrative, rather than per-
sonal, and usually involve relatively minor invasions of privacy.21 That
being said, the Court has applied this standard to searches of the per-
son. In Terry v. Ohio (“Terry”),22 the Court allowed law enforcement to
stop an individual (technically, a “seizure” under the Fourth Amend-
ment) and perform a cursory pat-down search even though the officer
lacked probable cause to believe a crime was taking place. The ratio-
nale for the Court was that the officer maintained a reasonable suspi-
cion that the frisk was necessary to protect officer safety.23 Such
reasonable suspicion must be based on specific and articulable facts.24
Importantly, the Terry Court required that reasonable suspicion
rise to the level of probable cause before an officer could perform a
“full blown” search or arrest.25 The Court has since reiterated that
“[o]rdinarily, a search—even one that may permissibly be carried out
without a warrant—must be based upon ‘probable cause’ to believe
18. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983); see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 161 (1925) (explaining that probable cause is a reasonable belief, based on specific
facts and circumstances, that “warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that
[an] offense has been committed”).
19. Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534–39 (1967).
20. See Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 277.
21. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598–99 (1981) (“The greater latitude to
conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property reflects the fact that the expecta-
tion of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs signif-
icantly from the sanctity accorded an individual’s home, and that this privacy interest may,
in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by regulatory schemes authorizing war-
rantless inspections.”).
22. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 27 (“[I]n determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such cir-
cumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion
or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the
facts in light of his experience.”) (citation omitted).
25. Id. at 10 (“If the ‘stop’ and the ‘frisk’ give rise to probable cause to believe that the
suspect has committed a crime, then the police should be empowered to make a formal
‘arrest,’ and a full incident ‘search’ of the person.”).
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that a violation of the law has occurred.”26 Therefore, with the excep-
tion of the minimal frisk allowed by Terry, warrantless searches of indi-
viduals require probable cause—the only difference is that in a
warrantless search, the officer, rather than a judge or magistrate, de-
termines if probable cause exists.
In sum, searches generally require a warrant. If a search takes
place without a warrant, it is presumed unlawful until the government
can prove that either (1) it has satisfied an exception to the warrant
requirement, or (2) there is a special governmental interest, coupled
with a low expectation of privacy (i.e., that the reasonableness stan-
dard should govern). Even if a warrant is not required, there still must
be probable cause in order to conduct a “full blown” search of a per-
son (i.e., beyond a frisk). This well-accepted doctrine remained the
law until 1985, when the Supreme Court carved out perhaps the larg-
est exception to traditional Fourth Amendment protections—the so-
called “special needs” exception.27
II. Backdrop to Redding: T.L.O. and Subsequent Circuit
Cases
A. New Jersey v. T.L.O.
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided New Jersey v. T.L.O., address-
ing, for the first time, the issue of searches of public school students
conducted by school officials.28 The case arose out of an incident at a
high school in New Jersey.29 A teacher reported to the principal’s of-
fice that she saw the defendant student smoking in a bathroom.30 The
vice principal spoke with the student and, unconvinced by her denials,
conducted an extensive search of the student’s purse.31 An initial
search produced a pack of cigarettes and rolling papers. A second,
more in-depth search revealed marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and ev-
idence that the student was involved in selling drugs.32 This evidence
26. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985); see also id. at 358 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“An unbroken line of cases in this Court have held that probable cause is a
prerequisite for a full-scale search.”).
27. See Bill O. Heder, The Development of Search and Seizure Law in Public Schools, 1999
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 71, 75 (1999) (arguing that the “special needs” exception is “the latest
and most broad exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment”).
28. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325.
29. Id. at 328.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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was given to the police, and the state brought delinquency charges
against the student.33
The student moved to suppress the evidence based on the theory
that it was obtained through a violation of her Fourth Amendment
rights, and the matter eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court.34
The Court first clarified that the Fourth Amendment extends to
searches performed by public school officials.35 However, it deter-
mined that such searches are governed by the “reasonableness” clause
of the Fourth Amendment, and, therefore, it employed a balancing
test that compared the individual’s privacy rights with the “govern-
ment’s need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public or-
der.”36 From this balancing act, the Court found that public schools
are excepted from the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.37
This exception is known as the “special needs” exception. With
this exception, the government need not procure a warrant when it
has a “special need” to search, and the school environment is a setting
where such a need exists.38
The Court also found that school officials do not need probable
cause to conduct a “full blown” search: “Rather, the legality of a search
of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all
the circumstances, of the search.”39 The Court devised a two-part test
to analyze whether a particular search is reasonable. First, the search
must be “justified in its inception,” which requires “reasonable
grounds” to believe that the search will reveal evidence of wrongdo-
ing—a violation of either the law or the school’s administrative poli-
cies.40 Second, the search must be “permissible in its scope,” which
requires the official conducting the search to employ methods that
are “reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not exces-
sively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the na-
ture of the infraction.”41
33. Id. at 329.
34. Id. at 331.
35. Id. at 336–37.
36. Id. at 337.
37. See id. at 340 (“[W]e hold today that school officials need not obtain a warrant
before searching a student who is under their authority.”).
38. See id. at 341; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
39. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
40. Id. at 341–42.
41. Id. at 342.
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Thus, the Court removed not one, but two of the basic Fourth
Amendment requirements: the warrant requirement and the need for
probable cause. As such, T.L.O. represents an unprecedented and
highly disturbing departure from traditional Fourth Amendment re-
quirements.42 Furthermore, the Court’s standard is vague and can be
manipulated by judges to find virtually any search valid if there is a
shred of “reasonableness.”43 Two federal circuit court decisions are
illustrative of this problem.
B. Applying T.L.O. to Student Strip Searches: The Williams and
Cornfield Decisions
A number of federal circuit courts have struggled to apply the
two-part test established by the T.L.O. Court.44 One of the most prob-
lematic issues is how to evaluate strip searches of students—based on
the T.L.O. reasonableness test or a higher Fourth Amendment stan-
dard (since T.L.O. did not concern a strip search). In the two cases
that follow, the court applied the former.
1. Williams by Williams v. Ellington
a. Factual and Procedural History
In Williams by Williams v. Ellington (“Ellington”),45 a student in-
formant reported to her high school principal, Ellington, that the
plaintiff, Williams, and another girl, Michelle, were inhaling a white
powdery substance.46 Ellington believed the report was reliable and
investigated the situation.47 She discovered one additional piece of
“evidence” pertaining to Williams: one of Williams’ teachers reported
that, during the previous semester, she had found a note under Wil-
42. See supra Part I; see also Scott A. Gartner, Strip Searches of Students: What Johnny Really
Learned at School and How Local School Boards Can Help Solve the Problem, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
921, 932 (1997) (“Not only are strip searches a rarity in the law, but so too are warrantless
searches supported by less than probable cause.”).
43. See David C. Blickenstaff, Strip Searches of Public School Students: Can New Jersey v.
T.L.O. Solve the Problem, 99 DICK. L. REV. 1, 43 (1994).
44. Gartner, supra note 42, at 949 (“Regrettably, the Supreme Court’s ‘guidance’ in
T.L.O. has offered little help to school personnel and courts alike, as evidenced by the case
law since 1985.”); see Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643–44
(2009) (explaining the different approaches that circuit courts have taken under the
T.L.O. decision).
45. 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991).
46. Id. at 882.
47. Id.
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liams’ desk that discussed parties and referenced drug use.48 On a
later day, the same student informant reported that “those girls are at
it again.”49 Ellington confronted the girls, at which time Michelle pro-
duced a small vial that contained “rush,” a legal substance.50 Uncon-
vinced that he had obtained all the evidence, Ellington proceeded to
conduct several searches of Williams:51 first, Ellington had Williams’
assigned locker searched; then, a second locker that Williams used was
searched; next, Williams’ books and purse were searched; and finally,
Ellington had female officials strip search Williams by requiring her to
remove her shirt and lower her jeans to her knees.52
Williams (by her father) sued the district and the officials in their
individual capacities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (“Section
1983”).53 First, the court addressed the issue of qualified immunity.
The general rule regarding qualified immunity is that officials will not
be held liable as long as the unconstitutionality of their conduct is not
“clearly established” such that they should have known they were vio-
lating someone’s rights.54 The court found that both the district and
the individual defendants were qualifiedly immune from suit.55 The
court also found that the strip search was justified under the Fourth
Amendment:
A study of the record leads us to conclude that Ellington and the
remaining Defendants were not unreasonable in suspecting, based
on the information available at the time, that a search of Williams
would reveal evidence of drugs or drug use. Further, Defendants
were not unreasonable, in light of the item sought (a small vial
containing suspected narcotics), in conducting a search so person-
ally intrusive in nature.56
48. Id. (“When [the teacher] questioned Williams about the letter, the student passed
it off as a joke . . . .”).
49. Id. at 883.
50. Id. “Rush” is legal to possess, but inhaling it is an unlawful misuse of the substance.
Id. at 882.
51. While Michelle was also searched, she was not a party to this appeal, and there-
fore, violations of her Fourth Amendment rights will not be discussed here.
52. Ellington, 936 F.2d at 883.
53. Id. Section 1983 is the means by which citizens can procure damages and equita-
ble relief when state officials have violated their rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Con-
trast this with the “motion to suppress” used by the student in New Jersy v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 337 (1985).
54. Ellington, 936 F.2d at 883–85. Qualified immunity is discussed in greater detail
infra Part V.
55. Id. at 885, 889. Qualified immunity is discussed further infra Part V. This Note
does not confront municipality immunity, which is at issue when a school district is sued.
56. Ellington, 936 F.2d at 887.
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Thus, the court was convinced it had satisfied the two-part T.L.O.
test. This strip search, according to these judges, was reasonable in its
inception and reasonable in its scope.
b. Analysis
One of the more disconcerting aspects of this case is how the
court foregoes individualized suspicion and allows suspicion of one
individual to be imputed to another.57 Specifically, there was more
reason to believe that Michelle, not Williams, was in violation of a
school rule or law: Michelle’s father reported that she had stolen
money from him, and that he feared she was using drugs; on the day
of the alleged drug use, Michelle was acting strange and claimed she
had the flu; and Michelle, not Williams, was the one who actually pro-
duced evidence of potential wrongdoing (the vial).58 Still, the court
seems to view this evidence as somehow adding to the suspicion vis-a`-
vis Williams. The only facts that implicated Williams directly were the
uncorroborated and unreliable reports of a fellow student, one who
could have had ulterior motives.59 The note found by Williams’
teacher does not bear on whether Williams was using drugs on this
particular day: it had been found the previous semester and, at worst,
referred to drug use off campus.60
This case serves as an example of how courts can use the vague
T.L.O. standard to uphold searches that would never be lawful in a
non-school environment. The case proves that T.L.O. went too far by
removing the warrant and probable cause requirements, and by refus-
ing to require individualized suspicion. School officials could have tried
to procure a warrant in this case: there were no exigent circumstances
or other indications that an immediate search was necessary. Of
course, such an attempt would have failed because there was no prob-
able cause to search Williams’ person. Ultimately, this case shows that
even if T.L.O. was right to eliminate the warrant requirement, the
probable cause standard must be maintained to prevent highly intru-
sive and patently unreasonable searches, such as these.
57. The T.L.O. Court did not resolve whether individualized suspicion is a require-
ment of the two-part reasonableness test. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8.
58. Ellington, 936 F.2d at 882–83.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 882.
668 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
2. Cornfield v. Consolidated High School District No. 230
a. Factual and Procedural History
In Cornfield v. Consolidated High School District No. 230 (“Corn-
field”),61 Cornfield brought a Section 1983 claim against his teacher
(“Spencer”), the dean (“Frye”), and his school district after he was
subjected to a strip search.62 The events leading up to the search be-
gan when a teacher’s aide reported to Spencer and Frye that she had
noticed “an unusual bulge in Cornfield’s crotch area.”63 Fearing that
Cornfield was “crotching drugs,” Spencer and Frye questioned Corn-
field and attempted to gain consent to search him—Cornfield
refused.64
In part because they believed a pat down search to be excessively
intrusive, Frye and Spencer decided to strip search Cornfield.65 They
escorted Cornfield to the boys’ locker room, made sure no one was
present, then locked the door.66 Cornfield was forced to undress com-
pletely, while the two men watched.67 Cornfield then changed into a
gym uniform, as the men looked through his clothes.68 Although irrel-
evant for Fourth Amendment purposes, it is worth noting they found
no evidence of wrongdoing.69
The circuit court upheld the search as reasonable.70 It also found
that the officials were qualifiedly immune.71 Under the two-part
T.L.O. test, the court first asked whether the search was permissible in
its inception. It found that “a number of relatively recent incidents
reported by various teachers and aides as well as their personal obser-
vations” gave Spencer and Frye reasonable suspicion to search.72 The
incidents were as follows: (1) on previous occasions, Cornfield had
61. 991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1993).
62. Id. at 1319.
63. Id.
64. Id. The court states that when called, Cornfield’s mother declined to consent to
the search of her son. Id. The court implies Cornfield also expressly refused to consent;
otherwise the Fourth Amendment claim would have failed here. See supra Part I (explain-
ing that consent satisfies an exception to traditional Fourth Amendment requirements).
65. See Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1319. The absurdity of this reasoning appears lost on the
court, as it did not so much as question it. See id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1323.
71. Id. at 1324. Judge Easterbrook criticized this as an advisory opinion since finding
the search reasonable mooted the immunity issue. Id. at 1328 (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring).
72. Id. at 1323 (majority opinion).
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allegedly stated he was dealing drugs and would test positive for mari-
juana; (2) Spencer believed Cornfield had failed a drug rehabilitation
program; (3) Cornfield once brought a bullet to school; (4) a bus
driver reported smelling marijuana “from where Cornfield was sit-
ting”; (5) students had previously reported seeing Cornfield in posses-
sion of, and smoking, marijuana; (6) Cornfield allegedly told Spencer
he constantly thought about drugs; (7) Cornfield had allegedly
“crotched” drugs before; and (8) this was the first time Spencer had
noticed “the unusual bulge in Cornfield’s crotch area.”73
The court then asked whether the search was permissible in its
scope.74 The court decided the issue in a single paragraph: since
Spencer and Frye believed drugs were hidden in the crotch area, per-
formed the search in the “privacy” of the boys’ locker room, stood a
fair distance away from Cornfield, and “did not physically touch him
or subject him to a body cavity search,” the search was reasonable in
scope.75
b. Analysis
The eight factors the court pointed to in upholding the inception
of the search no doubt raise concerns about Cornfield’s well-being,
but not one bears on the question of whether he was in possession of
drugs on that particular day. Reasonable suspicion requires “specific
and articulable facts.”76 Such facts these are not: each relates to past
incidents, many are unreliable (based on hearsay or uncorroborated
informant information), and most were adamantly denied by Corn-
field and his mother.77 Still, the court apparently believed that more is
inherently better, and found the search reasonable in its inception.78
The factors the court used to uphold the scope of the search also
do not properly weigh on the issue. For one, the idea that not per-
forming a cavity search somehow adds to the reasonableness of what
was done is ridiculous: there is virtually always a more intrusive search
that an official could have conducted, and it has no bearing on the
reasonableness of the search that was performed. Second, the location
of the search is irrelevant: whether it was performed in the boys’
locker room, the nurse’s office, or an unoccupied classroom, none of
73. Id. at 1322.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 374 (1993).
77. Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1322.
78. Id. at 1323.
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this bears on the issue of the intrusion itself. Indeed, the only factor
related to the reasonableness of the scope is the claim the officials
believed that the drugs were located in the crotch area. This bears on
the issue of whether the scope of the strip search was necessary to
ferret out the alleged infraction. But, of course, a mere belief is not
enough, and this search should have been found unreasonable in
scope as well as in its inception.
A final note on Cornfield relates to how the court addresses its own
precedent. Thirteen years earlier, and prior to the T.L.O. decision,
the Seventh Circuit decided Doe v. Renfrow (“Renfrow”).79 That court
took a very different approach to the issue of strip searching children:
“It does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude
search of a thirteen-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional
rights of some magnitude. More than that: it is a violation of any known
principles of human decency.”80 The Cornfield court takes this to mean
simply that “as the intrusiveness of the search of a student intensifies,
so too does the standard of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.”81
The court also states that its “sharp condemnation of the conduct of
the school officials in [Renfrow] stemmed from the fact that the strip
search of Doe was executed without any individualized suspicion and
without reasonable cause.”82 But this seems to miss the point of the
Renfrow court, which referred to a strip search as an “invasion of con-
stitutional rights” and a violation of “human decency.”83 There is no
qualification, no ambiguity. The Renfrow court understood that stu-
dent strip searches are simply wrong, by any measure. The manner in
which the Cornfield court does away with the Renfrow opinion appears
to be a desperate attempt to legitimize its decision in the face of a
previous case that, being too well-reasoned and righteous, could not
simply be ignored.
79. 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980).
80. Id. at 92–93 (emphasis added). The court continued:
We suggest as strongly as possible that the conduct herein described exceeded
the “bounds of reason” by two and a half country miles. It is not enough for us to
declare that the little girl involved was indeed deprived of her constitutional and
basic human rights. We must also permit her to seek damages from those who
caused this humiliation.
Id. at 93.
81. Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321.
82. Id. at 1324 (citation omitted).
83. Renfrow, 631 F.2d at 92–93.
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III. The Redding Decision: Factual and Procedural History
In June 2009, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of
searches of public school students.84 In this case, a mother sued the
school district and three officials after her daughter, Savana, was sub-
jected to a strip search.85 Savana, thirteen at the time, was searched
because the officials feared she was in possession of ibuprofen and
naproxen, both prohibited under school rules without prior
permission.86
A week before the search, a student reported to the assistant prin-
cipal, Wilson, that he had received pills from a fellow student, Marissa,
which had made him sick.87 He gave Wilson one of the pills, which
was later identified by the school nurse, Schwallier, as prescription
ibuprofen.88 A subsequent questioning of Marissa resulted in the fol-
lowing: Wilson confiscated a day planner that contained contra-
band;89 Marissa produced an additional pill, identified by the nurse as
over-the-counter naproxen; and Marissa claimed that Savana had sup-
plied the ibuprofen.90 Despite her cooperation, Marissa was then strip
searched.91
84. The Court also addressed student searches in 1995 when it upheld a school’s pol-
icy of randomly drug testing student athletes. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 664–65 (1995) (“Taking into account all the factors we have considered above—the
decreased expectation of privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the sever-
ity of the need met by the search—we conclude Vernonia’s Policy is reasonable and hence
constitutional.”). The immense overbreadth of this ruling was captured by Justice
O’Connor in her dissent: “By the reasoning of today’s decision, the millions of [public
school] students who participate in interscholastic sports, an overwhelming majority of
whom have given school officials no reason whatsoever to suspect they use drugs at school,
are open to an intrusive bodily search.” Id. at 667 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). See also Bd. of
Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002) (extending Vernonia by
permitting suspicionless drug testing of students that participate in any extracurricular
activity).
85. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2638 (2009).
86. Id. at 2637–38. The Court assumes the legitimacy of the rule, as school rules are
only invalidated when they are “patently arbitrary,” which this rule is not. See id. at 2640
n.1.
87. Id. at 2640.
88. Id.
89. The planner included “several knives, lighters, a permanent marker, and a ciga-
rette.” Id. at 2638.
90. Id. at 2640.
91. Id. Specifically, the Court states that “Marissa was then subjected to a search of her
bra and underpants . . . .” Id. While this raises some ambiguity regarding whether it was a
strip search or a search of only her clothes after they had been removed in private, the
Court implies the former. Justice Souter would no doubt have noted the material fact of
her disrobing in private prior to the search. Marissa was not a party to the appeal, meaning
that her Fourth Amendment rights were not addressed by the Court, but this Note would
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At that point, Savana was called into the principal’s office, where
Wilson showed her the day planner.92 Savana admitted that it was her
planner, but said that none of the incriminating items belonged to
her, adding that she had lent the planner to Marissa a few days ear-
lier.93 Wilson recognized Savana as one of a group of girls who had
been reported as “unusually rowdy” at a recent school dance.94 Wil-
son, therefore, decided to search Savana’s backpack and outer cloth-
ing.95 The Court held the T.L.O. reasonableness standard was satisfied
as to these initial searches: Marissa’s statement that the pills had come
from Savana, coupled with the reports of Savana’s behavior at the
dance, was enough to “warrant suspicion that Savana was involved in
pill distribution.”96
The searching did not end here.97 At the direction of Wilson,
Schwallier and an administrative assistant, Romero, took Savana to the
nurse’s office.98 Presumably, Wilson did not accompany them.99 In
the office, Schwallier and Romero ordered Savana to remove all of
her clothes except her undergarments.100 She was then told to pull
her bra and underpants away from her body so that the officials could
see if she was hiding pills.101 The Court found this strip search to be a
violation of Savana’s Fourth Amendment rights, reasoning “the con-
tent of the suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion.”102
Since this was a claim for damages brought under Section 1983,
as opposed to a criminal case in which the victim of the unlawful
search was trying to suppress seized evidence, the Court then turned
to the question of whether the school officials were qualifiedly im-
mune.103 The Court granted immunity, reasoning “the cases viewing
school strip searches differently from the way we see them are numer-
ous enough, with well-reasoned majority and dissenting opinions, to
like to acknowledge that she too suffered an unwarranted and unacceptable violation of
her rights.
92. Id. at 2638.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2641.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. The Court treated the situation as one evolving search, which was reasonable in
inception but unreasonable in scope. This Note disagrees, and argues there were at least
three separate searches: one of her clothes, one of her backpack, and one of her body.
98. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2638.
99. See id. Wilson is male, and Schwallier and Romero are both female. See id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2642.
103. Id. at 2643.
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counsel doubt that we were sufficiently clear in the prior statement of
law.”104
IV. Analysis of the Fourth Amendment Issues
A. The Court Should Have Restored Students’ Fourth Amendment
Rights
The Court was correct that the strip search was excessively intru-
sive and violative of the Fourth Amendment. However, a Fourth
Amendment violation should have been found even if the officials
had stopped after the initial search of Savana’s backpack and outer
clothing. It is disturbing that the Court believes that rowdy behavior at
a school dance (not an uncommon phenomenon) can add to the sus-
picion that an individual is engaged in “pill distribution.”105 The only
real evidence that Savana possessed pills was Marissa’s statement.
Since the behavior of the dance cannot reasonably serve as corrobora-
tion, Marissa’s statement was unreliable.106 The fact that the Court
could uphold the initial search is indication that T.L.O. is a flawed
precedent: the reasonableness standard is simply too weak and mallea-
ble to function as an adequate safeguard against the Constitution’s
prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures.”107 Therefore,
the Redding Court should have overruled T.L.O. and put an end to the
moratorium on the probable cause requirement in school searches.
Furthermore, it is unnecessary to have such a wide sweeping
school exception to the warrant requirement. There already exists an
exigency exception, which allows school officials to conduct reasona-
ble warrantless searches and seizures when justified by the immediacy
and dangerousness of a situation.108 Assuming that public schools are
appropriate arenas for an exception to the warrant requirement,
probable cause should still be required.109 Specifically, if there is no
consent, then a search of a student’s belongings should only proceed
if there is probable cause to believe a violation of the law or school
104. Id. at 2644.
105. Id. at 2641.
106. See Mawdsley & Cumming, supra note 5, at 6–9 (discussing the issue of student
informant reliability).
107. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
108. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978).
109. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 358 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“[P]robable cause . . . is the constitutional minimum for justifying a full-scale search,
regardless of whether it is conducted pursuant to a warrant or . . . within one of the excep-
tions to the warrant requirement.”).
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rules is in progress or has taken place.110 And, as argued infra, a
search of a student’s person should be prohibited.111
By upholding the T.L.O. test, the Court sanctioned the view that
public school students are the only non-prisoner citizens undeserving
of the protection of probable cause prior to a full-scale search.112 Such
a view is in direct contradiction to the promise of the Court in Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (“Tinker”): “Students
in school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitu-
tion.”113 It also conflicts with basic notions of equality and decency.
Yet, despite the Tinker promise, “many would argue that schoolchil-
dren rate as second-class citizens as far as their Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable search and seizure is concerned.”114
This is discriminatory, even dehumanizing, as it treats students “as
things or subjects to be manipulated or programmed . . . .”115 To put
an end to this inequality, students should be given the same protec-
tions as adults: that is, a presumption that a warrant is required, and if
the warrant is validly excepted, a strict condition of probable cause
before a full search of personal belongings can proceed. Indeed, one
commentator argues that, “[i]f the Fourth Amendment is to be any-
thing other than a hollow, unenforceable right, the same standards
that apply to adults must be applied to safeguard children . . . .”116
B. The Court Should Have Outlawed Student Strip Searches
Some searches are so intrusive that they are unreasonable under
any circumstances—student strip searches are the ultimate exam-
ple.117 A growing number of states apparently agree, and have en-
110. See supra Part I (describing probable cause). The question of whether desks and
lockers should fall into the category of a student’s “belongings” is beyond the scope of this
Note.
111. See infra Part IV.B.
112. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that no other case has
permitted a full-blown search on less than probable cause). But see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 558–60 (1979) (holding that prison inmates and pretrial detainees can be strip
searched on less than probable cause).
113. 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (referring, unequivocally,
to “the people,” not the “adult people”).
114. Gartner, supra note 42, at 954.
115. Scott C. Berman, Student Fourth Amendment Rights: Defining the Scope of T.L.O. School-
Search Exception, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1077, 1129 (1991) (quoting Rich, The Student’s Right to
Privacy, EDUC. DIG., Apr. 1985, at 32, 33).
116. Gartner, supra note 42, at 938.
117. See Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92–93 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Tarter v. Rayback,
742 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1984) (“We note that not only must there be a reasonable
ground to institute the search, the search itself must be reasonable. Thus, for example, the
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acted legislation that prohibits strip searches of students by school
officials.118 But the Court has refused to address the issue, let alone to
hold that such searches are categorically unreasonable (i.e., unlawful)
under the Fourth Amendment. The only Supreme Court case to di-
rectly address the constitutionality of strip searches (of adults) did so
in the prison context.119 Even there, in the context of the search of
pretrial defendants and convicted prisoners120 (both detained upon
probable cause) several justices expressed deep concern with the prac-
tice.121 By failing to ban student strip searches, and indeed, through
its sanctioning of the practice,122 the Redding Court has placed stu-
dents in the same category as prisoners.
The question must be asked, in light of the context in which
these searches take place, what are the public schools teaching school
children? Such flagrant disrespect for constitutional principles sets a
terrible example for students, teaching them that constitutional rights
are only for some.123 They now know discrimination is acceptable, so
long as there is a “good reason” for it. As a result, there is a fundamen-
tal hypocrisy at work: students are expected to salute the flag, respect
authority, and follow the law, while school officials need little more
than a hunch to subject these students to extreme indignity and po-
tential trauma.
authority of the school official would not justify a degrading body cavity search of a youth
in order to determine whether a student was in possession of contraband in violation of
school rules.”).
118. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49050 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 808A.2(4)
(West 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 70, § 24-102 (West 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 28A.600.230(3) (West 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.50 (3) (West 2005) (“Any official,
employee or agent of any school or school district who conducts a strip search of any pupil
is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.”).
119. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558–60 (1979). The case was brought by prisoners
who were submitted to what is likely the most humiliating and dehumanizing type of strip
search—the body cavity search. The case describes the search as follows: “If the inmate is a
male, he must lift his genitals and bend over to spread his buttocks for visual inspection.
The vaginal and anal cavities of female inmates also are visually inspected.” Id. at 558 n.39.
Nevertheless, the Court declined to require individualized suspicion for these searches and
held that they can be conducted on less than probable cause. Id. at 558–60.
120. See id. at 526.
121. See id. at 576–77 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In my view, the body-cavity searches of
MCC inmates represent one of the most grievous offenses against personal dignity and
common decency.”); see also id. at 594 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The body-cavity search—
clearly the greatest personal indignity—may be the least justifiable measure of all.”).
122. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643 (2009).
123. See Gartner, supra note 42, at 942 (“If schools violate that right [to privacy], as they
do when they conduct strip searches, students will naturally come to view the Fourth
Amendment and other constitutional provisions as mere platitudes, not to be taken
seriously.”).
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Many commentators have discussed the traumatic effect that a
strip search can have on students.124 Strip searches have been com-
pared to rape and have reportedly led to anxiety, depression, sleep
disorders, and other psychological injuries.125 One of the reasons that
they can be particularly damaging to children is that younger individ-
uals are often self-conscious about their bodies and more likely than
adults to be intimidated by older, more powerful (and usually trusted)
authority figures, such as teachers, principals, and other school offi-
cials.126 This abuse of authority and trust is unacceptable. If a school
official believes a student is concealing contraband on his or her per-
son, that official should simply call the student’s parents or notify the
police.
The need for this delegation, as opposed to officials taking mat-
ters into their own hands, is further supported by the fact that school
administrators are not experts in law enforcement.127 They are un-
qualified in matters of probable cause and reasonable suspicion. Iron-
ically, the T.L.O. Court expressed this concern with respect to a school
official’s inability to determine probable cause: “By focusing attention
on the question of reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers
and school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the
niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their conduct
according to the dictates of reason and common sense.”128 This rea-
soning is backwards. If officials cannot be trusted to understand a cer-
tain constitutional standard, then they should not be relieved of its
constraints. Instead, they should be prohibited from engaging in con-
duct that requires such understanding. While school officials deserve
deference in their administration of the nation’s schools, it goes too
far to give them special exemptions from constitutional constraints.
In sum, strip searches of school children must be ruled categori-
cally unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because no level of
124. See id. at 928 (“While some may walk away ‘merely’ embarrassed or degraded, the
experience paralyzes and traumatizes others.”); id. at 931 (“‘Strip searches by school offi-
cials are tantamount to child abuse and are ethically and constitutionally unacceptable.’”)
(quoting Jim McKinnon, Ban Strip Searches, U.S. Judge Is Asked, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 21,
1993, at B4); see also Blickenstaff, supra note 43, at 45 (“Although adults are affected by
strip searches as well, children are especially susceptible to psychological harm.”); Shatz,
supra note 5, at 11 (“Evidence from psychologists supports the assumption that any search
of a school age child or adolescent has a greater impact than would such a search of an
adult because the development of a sense of privacy is critical to a child’s maturation.”).
125. See Gartner, supra note 42, at 929.
126. See id. at 930.
127. See id. at 956.
128. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985).
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state interest can justify such extreme intrusions into personal privacy.
Strip searches are (1) contrary to the education process, (2) psycho-
logically damaging, and (3) inappropriate given school officials’ lack
of training and qualification in law enforcement and constitutional
matters.
There remains the issue of the Terry frisk, distinct from a strip
search, but still inappropriate to perform on a student. Pat down
searches involve many of the same risks and problems as strip
searches. In fact, an argument could be made that being physically
touched by school officials may be more traumatic than disrobing in
front of them. Also, as with strip searches, school officials lack the
expertise of law enforcement to determine when and if a pat down is
warranted.
However, if a Terry frisk of students is permitted, then it must pro-
ceed under the same standards as it does with adult suspects: that is,
an official can only perform a cursory pat down of the person’s outer
clothing if there exists reasonable suspicion to believe such action is
needed to protect the official’s safety.129 Under this standard, a frisk
would have been unlawful in all the strip search cases cited in this
Note, as none involved threats to the safety of the officials involved.130
V. Analysis of the Qualified Immunity Issue
A. A Brief Background on Qualified Immunity
There are two forms of immunity for governmental officials act-
ing in their official capacity.131 The first, “absolute immunity,” applies
to a select group of officials: the President of the United States, legisla-
tors, prosecutors, judges, and executive officers performing adjudica-
tive functions.132 Officials who do not fall into one of these categories
must argue for “qualified immunity.”133 The justification for both
129. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968).
130. T.L.O., Ellington, and Cornfield involved suspicions that the students had engaged
in prohibited conduct or were in possession of drugs. See supra Part II. Redding involved
suspicion that the student possessed unauthorized medication. See supra Part III. Talladega
and Thomas involved suspicions that the students had stolen small amounts of money. See
infra Part V. None of these situations involved threats to the official’s safety.
131. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). Individual immunity is distinct
from municipality immunity, for example, regarding a school district’s liability. See generally
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Municipality immunity is be-
yond the scope of this Note, which is primarily concerned with the rights and actions of
individuals.
132. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807.
133. Id.
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forms of immunity is to “shield [officials] from undue interference
with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.”134
Immunity law is functional rather than formalistic: it only applies if
this justification is satisfied.135
The Supreme Court has devised a rule for determining when
qualified immunity should be granted: “government officials perform-
ing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.”136 The Court went on to say, “Where an official
could be expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or
constitutional rights . . . [a plaintiff] may have a cause of action.”137
Thus, there appears to be two distinct aspects to the rule: rights need
to be “clearly established,” but at the same time, there is a definite
focus on reasonableness—the question of whether the official should
have known that the conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.
This Note argues that, while the rule may have been vague before
Redding, the Court should have clarified the unambiguous reasonable-
ness standard. In any event, qualified immunity—even under the pre-
existing standard—should not have been granted.
B. The Qualified Immunity Issue in Redding
1. Immunity Should Not Have Been Granted to the Individual
Defendants
The Redding Court was wrong to grant qualified immunity to the
school officials because the law was “clearly established.” The Court
did not alter the T.L.O. rule; it simply applied it to find a specific
search unreasonable.138 Justice Ginsburg argued this point in her dis-
sent from the grant of qualified immunity.139 Justice Stevens agreed:
Nothing the Court decides today alters this basic framework. It sim-
ply applies T.L.O. to declare unconstitutional a strip search of a 13-
134. Id. at 806. This Note is only concerned with qualified immunity, as school officials
do not fall into any of the groups that receive absolute immunity.
135. Id. at 810–11.
136. Id. at 818 (citation omitted). Additionally, “[t]he contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that [particular] right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
137. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (emphasis added).
138. See infra Part V.B.2.
139. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2646 (2009) (Gins-
burg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Court’s opinion in T.L.O. plainly
stated the controlling Fourth Amendment law.”).
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year-old honors student that was based on a groundless suspicion
that she might be hiding medicine in her underwear. This is, in
essence, a case in which clearly established law meets clearly outra-
geous conduct.140
Instead of recognizing this and respecting Savana’s right to a civil
remedy, the majority allows mere disagreement among federal judges
to determine the issue.141 This is inappropriate for at least two rea-
sons. First, “the clarity of a well-established right should not depend
on whether jurists have misread [Supreme Court] precedents.”142 Sec-
ond, the four cases cited by the majority as evidence that the law was
not “clearly established”143 were not “well-reasoned,” despite the ma-
jority’s contentions. These cases should have been dismissed as simply
wrong.
The Court first cited the original Ninth Circuit decision in Red-
ding, which declined to find a Fourth Amendment violation in
Savana’s strip search.144 The citation to the appellate court is curious,
as Redding itself indicates the Ninth Circuit opinion was flawed.145 The
T.L.O. rule is predicated on reasonableness: if the Ninth Circuit truly
erred in its analysis of the rule’s application, then the reviewing court
should find the lower court’s decision unreasonable. Yet, the Court
cites it as evidence of a reasonable misunderstanding of the rule.
The second case cited was Ellington, which, as discussed supra Part
II.B.1, engaged in a highly flawed Fourth Amendment analysis.146 The
third and fourth cases cited by the Court are disturbing. First was Jen-
kins v. Talladega City Bd. of Ed. (“Talladega”),147 which granted immu-
nity to officials who strip searched two eight-year-old girls in an effort
to recover a missing seven dollars.148 Next was Thomas v. Roberts
(“Thomas”),149 which granted qualified immunity to officials who con-
ducted strip searches of an entire fifth grade class because twenty-six
dollars had gone missing.150
140. Id. at 2644 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141. Id. at 2643–44.
142. Id. at 2645.
143. Id. at 2643–44.
144. See id. at 2638.
145. This is implicit in the Court’s partial affirmance of the en banc Ninth Circuit opin-
ion, which overruled the earlier Ninth Circuit decision that had upheld the search of
Savana as permissible under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 2638.
146. Id. at 2643.
147. 115 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 1997).
148. Id. at 822–23.
149. 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003).
150. Id. at 952.
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This is deeply troubling. T.L.O. clearly established the impermissi-
bility of the strip searches that took place in Talladega and Thomas—
T.L.O. included in its test that searches are unreasonable if “exces-
sively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature
of the infraction.”151 The nature of the alleged infractions in these cases,
theft of seven and twenty-six dollars, respectively, clearly do not permit
the excessive intrusiveness of the searches performed.
Not only did the Court give undue weight to judicial disagree-
ment, but the decisions that it cited are in clear conflict with the
T.L.O. mandate. The Court should have taken this into account in its
analysis of cases that purport to show the law was not clearly estab-
lished. No weight should have been given to these cases. The Court
should have recognized the law was clearly established, meaning that
Savana was entitled to be “made whole” by the civil law system.
2. The Court Failed to Ensure Future Violations Would Be
Remedied
Even if the Court was correct that the law had not already been
clearly established, it should have clearly established it. But the case
offers no clarity regarding the preexisting law. Instead, the “Redding
Rule,” though purportedly “clear,” is anything but:
We do mean, though, to make it clear that the T.L.O. concern to
limit a school search to reasonable scope requires the support of
reasonable suspicion of danger or of [a student’s] resort to under-
wear for hiding evidence of wrongdoing before a search can rea-
sonably make the quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks
to exposure of intimate parts. The meaning of such a search, and
the degradation its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that
intrusive in a category of its own demanding its own specific
suspicions.152
At first blush, the Court seems to clarify there must be a threat of
danger before a strip search can take place. However, it adds that if
there is reasonable suspicion that the student may have resorted to
hiding “evidence of [any] wrongdoing” in his or her outer undergar-
ments, then a strip search is permissible. This means the rule is un-
changed, since T.L.O. already required reasonable grounds that
evidence of wrongdoing would be found in the location to be
searched.153
151. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (emphasis added).
152. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643 (2009).
153. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
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C. The Qualified Immunity Standard Should Be Revised
Even if qualified immunity was properly granted in this case, the
Court should have revised the standard so as to prevent defendants,
such as those in Redding, from skirting liability in the future. Courts
must prevent government officials from engaging in such reprehensi-
ble conduct. Indeed, without an adequate remedy, there is little to
deter officials from intruding on individual rights, since the odds are
likely they will never face liability.
Language in the Redding case provides an idea for how to im-
prove the standard. Justice Souter stated, “The unconstitutionality of
outrageous conduct obviously will be unconstitutional, this being the
reason, as Judge Posner has said, that ‘[t]he easiest cases don’t even
arise.’”154 Unfortunately, though, this does not seem to be entirely ac-
curate; the conduct in Williams was “outrageous,” the intrusions in
Cornfield were “outrageous,” and the search for common anti-inflam-
matory medicine in the underwear of a thirteen-year-old girl was “out-
rageous.”155 Not to mention the patently “outrageous” searches
conducted in Talledega and Thomas.156 Yet qualified immunity was
granted to the officials in each of these cases.157
It is time to establish a qualified immunity standard that is truly
based on “outrageous” conduct. An objective reasonableness test
should be employed: officials should not be granted qualified immu-
nity unless they demonstrate their conduct was objectively reasonable
(that is, a reasonable person would assume that it was lawful). This test
would not leave the possibility for relief in the hands of judges who,
despite their usual legal expertise, at times fail to clearly convey the
law. The clarity of a rule inevitably is subject to the practical limita-
tions, and inevitable ambiguity, of the written word. To solve these
problems, this new standard would not base immunity on the prose of
any particular opinion. Instead, it would eliminate the possibility of
immunity if an objective person should have known that the conduct,
being so outrageous, unwarranted, or unduly intrusive, was unlawful.
154. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643 (quoting K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir.
1990)).
155. See supra Parts II.B, III.
156. See supra Part V.B.1.
157. See supra Parts II.B, III & V.B.1. Of course, in some of these cases, the courts also
found no Fourth Amendment violation at all, but that is a different issue. See discussion
supra Part II.B.
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Conclusion
The Redding Court was correct in recognizing the unlawfulness of
the strip search of Savana. But the Court deserves no praise regarding
the remainder of the opinion. Other than this one obvious conclu-
sion, it got nothing right. When given the chance to establish Fourth
Amendment equality for school children, it deferred to a flawed pre-
cedent. When finally confronted with the issue of school officials strip
searching students, it side-stepped the problem. And when offered the
opportunity to provide a remedy for the abuse of constitutional rights,
it yielded to officials who were “just doing their jobs.” As a result,
school children remain under-protected, and officials can continue to
strip search students with a high likelihood of impunity.
As explained by Justice Blackmun, “Constitutional rights do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the
state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected
by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”158 Today’s
Court has forgotten this fact, as evidenced by its failure to see that
school children are properly protected under our Constitution.
158. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. V. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
